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Abstract: Coexisting and eye-watering levels of food abundance, waste, overconsumption and 
hunger, are symptomatic of a broken food system punctuated by vested interests in systematic 
overproduction.  This article evaluates EnglandÕs ÔnewÕ approach to food waste in light of concerns 
that policy-makers have framed food waste as a consumer behaviour problem, rather than a structural 
challenge.  The Resources and Waste StrategyÕs acknowledgement of normalised overproduction is thus 
remarkable, but unexpected.  However, frame critical analysis reveals how an apparent departure 
from preoccupations with economic growth, combined with promises of government action, obscure 
an ongoing reluctance to intervene against powerful interests and the causes (not symptoms) of food 
waste.  Legislative proposals, rather than reducing surplus, shift the burden of redistributing food away 
from the state and retailers, on to charities and farmers.  With England, perhaps wrongly, seen as a 
world-leader on food waste, this has implications for other jurisdictions, as well as forthcoming 
consultations. 
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Waste has been relatively neglected by legal academics.1  This may be due to its complexity,2 
or perceptions of banality (Ôeyes tend to glaze over at the mention of waste lawÕ).3 But this 
belies wasteÕs scholarly and practical interest and importance.  Waste is a fascinating topic of 
enormous significance.  Inescapably bound up with issues of production and consumption, 
waste touches on almost every aspect of our daily lives, reaching into the core of 
contemporary business models and our global economic systemÕs reliance on growth.  
Indeed, waste is always about more than just waste, exemplified by tensions between waste 
management (what we do with stuff once it becomes waste) and resource management (how 
do we manage stuff so as to prevent it becoming waste in the first place).4  Waste also raises 
fundamental questions at the heart of environmental law: matters of value and distribution; 
the extent of individual and business responsibility; and the role of the state in addressing 
global problems.  
Food waste is no exception: engaging, significant and, until recently, ignored by legal 
academics.5  Few resources are as important as food.  Its production, distribution and value 
are embedded within complex agri-food supply chains reaching beyond territorial 
boundaries.  In addition to a waste of resources (land, soil, water, energy), food waste is also 
a climate problem.  Were the 3.3 billion tonnes of global annual greenhouse gas emissions 
from food waste released by a single country, it would be the third largest emitter after China 
and the United States.6 The tendency to focus on waste rather than resource management 
has also been problematic in the context of food, central in failures to capture the 
particularities of managing a precious and often perishable resource within supply chains 
punctuated by influential vested interests in maintaining systemic levels of overproduction.7  
With one-third of all food grown globally not eaten,8 and approximately 821 million people 
undernourished worldwide,9 food waste is not just a generic waste problem, but a specific 
resource challenge, subsumed within the complexities and power dynamics of the global 
food supply chain. 
 
1 Although not entirely without scholarly attention, see I Cheyne ÔThe Definition of Waste in EC LawÕ (2002) 
14 Journal of Environmental Law 61; R Lee and E. Stokes ÔRehabilitating the Definition of Waste: Is It Fully 
Recovered?Õ (2008) 8 Yearbook of European Environmental Law 162; E Scotford ÔThe New Waste Directive 
- Trying to Do It All...an Early AssessmentÕ (2009) 11 Environmental Law Review 75. 
2 S Tromans ÔEC Waste LawÑA Complete Mess?Õ (2001) 13 Journal of Environmental Law 133.  
3 M Lee EU Environmental Law: Challenges, Change and Decision-Making (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1st 
edn, 2005) 213. 
4 E Scotford ÔTrash or Treasure: Policy Tensions in EC Waste RegulationÕ (2007) 19 Journal of 
Environmental Law 367. 
5 C Bradshaw ÔWaste Law and the Value of FoodÕ (2018) 30 Journal of Environmental Law 311; T Ferrando 
and J Mansuy, ÔThe European Action against Food Loss and Waste: Co-Regulation and Collisions on the 
Way to the Sustainable Development GoalsÕ (2018) 37 Yearbook of European Law 424; M Blakeney Food 
Loss and Food Waste: Causes and Solutions (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2019). 
6 HM Government Our Waste, Our Resources: A Strategy for England (London: Crown Copyright, 2018) p 99. 
7 Bradshaw, above n 5; Z Gille ÔFrom Risk to Waste: Global Food Waste RegimesÕ in D Evans, H Campbell 
and A Murcott (eds) Waste Matters - New Perspectives on Food and Society (Oxford: Wiley, 2013). 
8 FAO Food Wastage Footprint: Impacts on Natural Resources (Summary Report) (FAO, 2013); J Gustavsson and 
others ÔGlobal Food Losses and Food Waste: Extent, Causes and PreventionÕ (Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations, 2011). 
9 FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO (ed) The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2018: 
Building Climate Resilience for Food Security and Nutrition (FAO, 2018). 
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With the UK regarded as an international leader on tackling food waste,10 EnglandÕs 
fresh approach to food waste warrants particular scrutiny.  Our Waste, Our Resources: A Strategy 
for England (Ôthe StrategyÕ), published in December 2018, confirms food waste as an ongoing 
government priority but remarks that a Ônew approach is neededÕ.11  It sets an aspirational 
target of  eliminating food waste to landfill by 2030, and commits to the UN Sustainable 
Development Goal of halving per capita retail and consumer food waste, also by 2030.12  The 
Strategy in some respects embodies an unexpected policy shift, at least when compared with 
the prior policy position, the 2013 Waste Prevention Programme for England (Ôthe 
ProgrammeÕ).13  However, much of the relevant detail to evaluating the contours of this shift 
will reside in forthcoming consultative and legislative detail.  This article therefore offers an 
early assessment by exploring how the Strategy ÔframesÕ the problem of food waste, 
particularly in ways which are different compared to frames adopted under the Programme.  
Problem frames matter.  They allocate causal and reformatory responsibility, 
challenge or maintain existing power structures, and push certain values and actors forward 
and others into shadow.  Moreover, problem frames in high-level policy have particular 
significance, not least because of policyÕs centrality in environmental law.  But evaluating 
constructions of the complex, socio-political world is a difficult, profoundly subjective, 
exercise.14  In view of this, and in response to calls for methodological clarity in maturing 
environmental legal scholarship,15 this article explicates the waste policy frames by identifying 
assumptions, hidden premises and normative conclusions, and explores how elaborated or 
restricted they are.  In particular, we ask to what extent these frames are capable of 
accommodating accounts in the literature that food waste often arises from embedded, 
power-laden and structural factors across the supply chain which drive overproduction and 
overconsumption.  While the Programme was restrictive, the Strategy is more elaborated, in 
three ways.  
First, where the Programme subsumed food waste indiscriminately within generic 
approaches to waste, the Strategy constructs food waste as a specific challenge.  Second, 
while the Programme constructed waste as an economic opportunity, so that waste 
prevention efforts can (must?) contribute to economic growth, the Strategy identifies growth 
as part of the problem.  Gone is the focus on the Ôbusiness caseÕ for waste prevention which, 
under the Programme, restricted contemplating what the Strategy explicitly acknowledges: 
the existence of excess quantities of food, and its structural causes.  Third, whereas the 
Programme hollowed out food waste prevention law and governance, and government 
Ôstepped backÕ from food waste, under the Strategy, government appears to Ôstep back inÕ, 
proposing a range of legislative measures, and seeking powers under the Agriculture Bill to 
 
10 J Bloom American Wasteland: How America Throws Away Nearly Half of Its Food (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo 
Lifelong Books, 2011) ch 11, ÔGreat, Britain! A Kingdom United in Hating WasteÕ. 
11 The Strategy, above n 6, p 99. 
12 Ibid, pp 10Ð11, 18 and 99. 
13 HM Government Prevention Is Better than Cure: The Role of Waste Prevention in Moving to a More Resource Efficient 
Economy (London: Crown Copyright 2013). 
14 OW Pedersen ÔModest Pragmatic Lessons for a Diverse and Incoherent Environmental LawÕ (2013) 33 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 103. 
15 E Fisher and others ÔMaturity and Methodology: Starting a Debate about Environmental Law ScholarshipÕ 
(2009) 21 Journal of Environmental Law 213. 
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address food waste caused by unfair trading practices (UTPs).  This contrasts with previous 
proclamations that legislation to tackle food waste would be like Ôusing a sledgehammer to 
crack a nutÕ.16  In many ways, the Strategy Ôtalks the talkÕ of a more elaborated frame. It 
remains to be seen whether what follows will Ôwalk the walkÕ.  The StrategyÕs prescriptions 
do not always match its diagnosis of the problem: rather than stepping in to reduce 
overproduction, the burden of redistributing surplus food is shifted away from the state and 
retailers onto charities and farmers.  Overproduction remains the Ôelephant in the roomÕ, 
with responsibility for food waste not meaningfully distributed across the supply chain. 
The article begins by outlining the significance of frames in government policy and 
how we might evaluate them, before briefly situating high-level waste policy within the food 
waste scholarship.  It then explores three overarching ways in which the Strategy is less 
restrictive than the Programme: first, by acknowledging food waste as a specific rather than 
generic waste problem; second, by reframing economic growth as part of the problem; and 
third, by assuming a role for the state in the previously hollowed out law and regulation of 
food waste prevention. 
 
 
PROBLEM FRAMES MATTER 
 
A rich (and large) literature highlights how problems do not exist inherently Ôout thereÕ as 
social facts awaiting discovery, readily packaged for policy makers to address.17  Undesirable 
situations are instead actively convertedÑÔframedÕÑinto understandable problems.  The 
literature draws a distinction between ÔframingÕ and ÔframesÕ.  Framing is as an active and 
iterative process, where actors engage in the selection, interpretation, production and 
maintenance of meaning.18  A frame is the substantive outcome of a framing process, 
providing a somewhat static, definitional interpretation of a particular situation allowing 
actors to make sense of complex realities.19  A frame is a categorising or taxonomising 
structure, a central organising idea, narrative, or interpretive schema which allows actors to 
 
16 House of Commons Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee Oral Evidence: Food Waste HC 429 
(2017), Q 528, evidence of Dr Thrse Coffey MP; J Parsons ÔCoffey Rules out Food Waste Regulation 
ÒSledgehammerÓÕ [2017] ENDS Report. 
17 See eg DA Snow and RD Benford ÔMaster Frames and Cycles of ProtestÕ in AD Morris and C McClurg 
Mueller (eds) Frontiers in Social Movement Theory (London: Yale University Press, 1992); M Rein and D Schn 
ÔReframing Policy DiscourseÕ in F Fischer and J Forester (eds) The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and 
Planning (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993) p 146; CE Coburn ÔFraming the Problem of Reading 
Instruction: Using Frame Analysis to Uncover the Microprocesses of Policy ImplementationÕ (2006) 43 
American Educational Research Journal 343 p 343; F Daviter ÔPolicy Framing in the European UnionÕ (2007) 
14 Journal of European Public Policy 654; M van Hulst and D Yanow ÔFrom Policy ÒFramesÓ to ÒFramingÓ: 
Theorizing a More Dynamic, Political ApproachÕ (2014) 46 The American Review of Public Administration 92; 
C Hilson ÔFraming Fracking: Which Frames Are Heard in English Planning and Environmental Policy and 
Practice?Õ (2015) 27 Journal of Environmental Law 177. 
18 DA Stone ÔCausal Stories and the Formation of Policy AgendasÕ (1989) 104 Political Science Quarterly 281; 
Snow and Benford, above n 17; Rein and Schn, ÔReframing Policy DiscourseÕ, above n 17. 
19 Rein and Schn ÔReframing Policy Discourse,Õ above n 17; RA Payne ÔPersuasion, Frames and Norm 
ConstructionÕ (2001) 7 European Journal of International Relations 37; van Hulst and Yanow, above n 17; 
Coburn, above n 17; Snow and Benford, above n 17.  
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make sense of an Ôamorphous, ill-defined problematic situationÕ.20   The framing process is 
an important locus of study in itself, and there are limitations to what might be revealed 
through analysis of resulting frames alone. As will be seen, however, frames adopted in high-
level policy documents matter: they attribute causal and reformatory responsibility, and in 
doing so, may exclude or marginalise important accounts of phenomena, as well as possible 
interventions, while protecting (or challenging) existing structural orders.  This framing 
literature, briefly outlined below, is used later in the article to unpack the StrategyÕs new 
approach to food waste.  
At the heart of frames are causal narratives: Ôa package of ideas that includes, at least 
implicitly, an account of the causes and consequences of undesirable circumstances and a 
theory about how to improve them.Õ21  Snow and Benford refer to this as ÔdiagnosticÕ and 
ÔprognosticÕ attribution.22  Diagnostic attribution involves identifying the causes of a 
problem.  This informs and shapes prognostic attribution, which outlines the nature of 
possible ÔprescriptionsÕ, or the range of viable solutions and interventions.  Despite 
diagnostic attribution having Ôthe most profound effect on where one ends upÕ, there is a 
tendency to decide on solutions prematurely, instead of allowing these to flow from careful 
problem definition;23 what the literature calls Ôsolution-mindednessÕ.24  Through diagnostic 
and prognostic attribution, frames can highlight some aspects of the problem and throw 
others into shadow, and legitimate some solutions and actors, while neglecting, devaluing or 
excluding others.25  As Rein and Schn note, 'whatever is said of a thing, denies something 
else of it',26 identifying things as ÔthisÕ, but not as ÔthatÕ.27  Furthermore, some frames are 
Ôconsistently shut outÕ, particularly structural or other complex accounts of problems which 
identify economic or political systems as the causes of problems.28 As will be seen, structural 
causes of overproduction and food waste, while in the StrategyÕs diagnostic frame, are 
somewhat excluded from its prognostic frame. 
Frames can thus locate responsibility and burdens differently.  They might protect 
an existing structural order, or challenge that status quo by redistributing power or reshaping 
authority relations.29 Given frames allocate causal and reformatory responsibility, counter-
frames can and do arise.30  Problem framing is thus often described as a dispute, battle or 
 
20 Rein and Schn ÔReframing Policy DiscourseÕ, above n 17, pp 146Ð147; Snow and Benford, above n 17, p 
137; JA Weiss ÔThe Powers of Problem Definition: The Case of Government PaperworkÕ (1989) 22 Policy 
Sciences 97 p 118; van Hulst and Yanow, above n 17; RM Entman ÔFraming: Toward Clarification of a 
Fractured ParadigmÕ (1993) 43 Journal of Communication 51 p 52; Daviter, above n 17; Payne, above n 19. 
21 Weiss, above n 20, 97; Stone, above n 18. 
22 Snow and Benford, above n 17; RD Benford and DA Snow ÔFraming Processes and Social Movements: An 
Overview and AssessmentÕ (2000) 26 Annual Review of Sociology 611. 
23 LV Bardwell ÔProblem-Framing: A Perspective on Environmental Problem-SolvingÕ (1991) 15 
Environmental Management 603 p 605.  
24 Ibid, p 608. 
25 Coburn, above n 17, p 347; Weiss, above n 20; Stone, above n 18. 
26 M Rein and DA Schn ÔProblem Setting in Policy ResearchÕ in CH Weiss (ed) Using Social Research in Public 
Policy Making (Lexington MA: Lexington Books, 1977) p 239. 
27 van Hulst and Yanow, above n 17, p 99. 
28 Stone, above n 18, pp 288Ð292. 
29 Stone, above n 18; Weiss, above n 20; Coburn, above n 17. 
30 Coburn, above n 17, p 347. 
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war between competing frames.31  While a policy frame may be settled for many years, 
consensus can be challenged and undone: policy frames are Ôcurrents in the stream of political 
discourseÕ.32 As will be seen, even the frame itself is a weapon of advocacy or rhetoric, where 
actors deliberately portray problems 'in ways calculated to gain support for their side É while 
making it seem as though they are simply describing factsÕ.33  Deborah Stone provides a vivid 
account: 
 
Even when there is a strong statistical and logical link between a substance and a 
problem - such as between alcohol and car accidents, handguns and homicides, 
tobacco and cancer deaths, or cocaine and overdose deaths - there is still a range of 
places to locate control and impose sanctions É Finding the true or ultimate cause 
of harms in these policy areas is not what is at issue.  Rather, the fight is about locating 
moral responsibility and real economic costs on a chain of possible causes.34  
 
Frames are thus more than expressions of empirical reality, and locating moral and economic 
responsibility is often more about the Ôpolitical strength of different groupsÕ than it is about, 
say, causal logic or statistical proof.35 At the very least, Ônegotiating among and between 
frames is likely to be shaped by structures of power and authorityÕ,36 so that framing is Ôsubject 
to strong competitive forces.Õ37  It is thus important to keep in mind when analysing policy 
that dominant frames may reflect the outcome of power dynamics, as opposed to widely 
accepted accounts of a problem. 
In constructing the Ôcomplex and multidimensional socio-political world' into 
identifiable problems,38 frames are often informed by pre-existing values and ideologies.39  
There is thus some overlap with sense-making, where actors use pre-existing cognitive 
frameworks to understand new problems.40  As Payne notes, 'an actor is more likely to accept 
new claims if they are shown to be similar to already accepted ideas'.41  A 'resonant' frame 
with 'mobilising potencyÕ is often necessary for it to 'take holdÕ.42 Frames must not only 
'accommodate' political realities, but 'create' those realities, by motivating and coordinating 
action.43  Frames may therefore use conceptual hooks, draw on a repertoire of cultural 
resources, and model prior thought, so as to render a problem 'sensible in terms of pre-
 
31 Stone, above n 18, p 283; Hilson, above n 17; Snow and Benford, above n 17. 
32 Weiss, above n 20. 
33 Stone, above n 18, p 282. See also E Stokes ÔRegulatory Domain and Regulatory Dexterity: Critiquing the 
UK Governance of ÒFrackingÓÕ (2016) 79 The Modern Law Review 961. 
34 Stone, above n 18, p 297. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Coburn, above n 17, p 347.  
37 FR Baumgartner and C Mahoney ÔThe Two Faces of Framing: Individual-Level Framing and Collective Issue 
Definition in the European UnionÕ (2008) 9 European Union Politics 435 p 435. 
38 van Hulst and Yanow, above n 17; Coburn, above n 17, pp 343Ð344. 
39 Weiss, above n 20. 
40 Coburn, above n 17; van Hulst and Yanow, above n 17. 
41 Payne, above n 19. 
42 Benford and Snow, above n 22. 
43 Weiss, above n 20; Coburn, above n 17.  
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existing thinking'.44  Frames can thus be rhetorical and/or action-based.45  Rhetorical frames 
feature a persuasive narrative to Ôwin the allegiance of large groups of peopleÕ, whereas action 
frames may inform policy programmes and Ôdetermine the content of laws, regulations and 
proceduresÕ.46  So not only are frames potentially expressions of power, but they are subject 
to strategic forces, mediated by pre-existing ideologies and shaped by the need for a frame 
to take hold with constituents.  As will be seen, the Strategy at first sight appears more action-
based than rhetorical, but its promised sense of ÔactionÕ may obscure an ongoing reluctance 
to step in against the interests of powerful actors. 
What is a ÔgoodÕ problem definition, or the ÔbestÕ policy frame, and how do we know?  
With conflicting frames, we are faced not with disagreements that can be settled by appeal 
to established facts, but competing (even ideologically opposed) views of the world.47  
Frames can create multiple social realities, even when based upon the same evidence.48  This 
will be familiar to environmental lawyers, given environmental problems are Ôcomplex, 
plagued with uncertainty, and extremely politicalÕ.49  Liz Fisher views this through the lens of 
environmental problems as Ôhot situationsÕ, where disputes are not ad hoc, but foundational, 
arising from potentially mutually incompatible understandings of the world informed by 
differing ideologies and values which, are themselves, not easily reconcilable.50  In hot 
situations, where multiple frames apply, any frame is controversial, and what is ÔbestÕ is not 
Ôan objective criterionÕ, but shaped by a mixture of normative concerns and politics.51   
For scholars, this requires discerning a terrain between extreme positivism, where 
competing frames are Ôresolvable by reference to facts and logicÕ, and extreme relativism, 
where all frames are equally Ôacceptable or compellingÕ.52 This terrain might lie in frame 
critical analysis and questioning.53 This involves explication of conflicting frames, identifying 
taken-for-granted assumptions, hidden premises and normative conclusions.54  Frame critical 
analysis asks whether frames imply or permit systematic analysis of alternatives, and which 
political values are moved forwards and backwards.55 Is the frame Ôrestricted, rigid and 
 
44 Coburn, above n 17; van Hulst and Yanow, above n 17; Benford and Snow, above n 22; DA Snow and others 
ÔFrame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement ParticipationÕ (1986) 51 American 
Sociological Review 464. 
45 Snow and Benford, above n 17, pp 138Ð139. 
46 van Hulst and Yanow, above n 17; DA Schn and M Rein Frame Reflection (New York: Basic Books, 1994) p 
32. 
47 Rein and Schn ÔReframing Policy DiscourseÕ, above n 17. See also Hilson, above n 17. 
48 Rein and Schn ÔReframing Policy DiscourseÕ, above n 17, pp 147Ð148. 
49 Bardwell, above n 23, p 603. See also JS Dryzek The Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005); M Schwarz and M Thompson Divided We Stand: Redefining Politics, Technology and 
Social Choice (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990) pp 4Ð6; E Fisher, B Lange and E 
Scotford Environmental Law: Text, Cases & Materials (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1st edn, 2013) pp 46Ð53. 
50 E Fisher ÔEnvironmental Law as ÒHotÓ LawÕ (2013) 25 Journal of Environmental Law 347; Fisher, Lange 
and Scotford, above n 49, pp 52Ð53. 
51 Fisher, above n 50, pp 350Ð352. 
52 Rein and Schn ÔReframing Policy DiscourseÕ, above n 17, pp 148Ð150. 
53 See also Pedersen, above n 14, where this middle ground lies in ÔpragmatismÕ. 
54 Rein and Schn ÔReframing Policy DiscourseÕ, above n 17, p 150. See also Weiss, above n 20; Daviter, 
above n 17. 
55 Rein and Schn ÔReframing Policy DiscourseÕ, above n 17; Weiss, above n 20. See also J Salzman and M 
Doyle ÔTurning the World Upside Down: How Frames of Reference Shape Environmental LawÕ 44 
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particularistic,' organised in a narrow band of ideas and providing a constricted range of 
definitions?56  Or is the frame more Ôelaborated, flexible and elasticÕ, organised in terms of a 
wide range of ideas, and inclusive in its problem-solving approach?57  Fisher similarly 
highlights scholarshipÕs role in Ôrigorous descriptionÕ and Ômeasured identificationÕ of frames, 
exploring whether mainstream accounts are too narrow, or practices are unrecognised.58    
Indeed, engaging in rigorous frame explication and measured, frame-critical analysis, 
is precisely the work required of mature environmental law scholarship.59 And as discussed 
later in the article, frame-criticality helps unpack EnglandÕs approach to food waste. 
 
 
POLICY FRAMES AND DISTRIBUTED RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
FOOD WASTE 
 
This section briefly explains the significance of policy frames, particularly for lawyers, before 
situating them within food waste scholarship.  Frames are generated in multiple, not 
necessarily governmental, fora, and at multiple levels.60  Similarly, government frames can be 
found in numerous departments, policy contexts and outputs, which may not always cohere 
into a single narrative.61  Policy thus sits within a broader political and institutional context.62  
Nonetheless, environmental policy, while not easy to define, is a worthy site of inquiry for 
lawyers.63  It is pervasive in environmental law, defying attempts to disentangle law from 
policy.64  High-level policy particularly acts as an action-based frame, guiding what is expected 
by numerous actors.  When proposing legislative intervention, policy is also key to defining 
the ÔmischiefÕ of legislation.  Policy frames thus shape the contours of legislative debate, but 
also the parameters of legislative opportunity: a governmental policy frame is not only central 
to defining legislative success or failure, but part of the story as to whether legislation is even 
on the table, and why (or why not).   
Waste policy is no exception.  The 2013 Programme has quasi-legal status beyond 
more ad hoc developments, given Waste Prevention Programmes are produced periodically 
 
Environmental Law 1; M Rein and D Schn ÔFrame-Critical Policy Analysis and Frame-Reflective Policy 
PracticeÕ (1996) 9 Knowledge and Policy 85. 
56 Snow and Benford, above n 17.  
57 Ibid. 
58 Fisher, above n 50, pp 354Ð356. 
59 On this generally, see eg OW Pedersen (ed) Perspectives on Environmental Law Scholarship: Essays on Purpose, 
Shape and Direction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018). 
60 See eg C Hilson ÔFraming the Local and the Global in the Anti-Nuclear Movement: Law and the Politics of 
PlaceÕ (2009) 36 Journal of Law and Society 94; Benford and Snow, above n 22. 
61 See eg E Scotford and J Robinson ÔUK Environmental Legislation and Its Administration in 2013Ñ
Achievements, Challenges and ProspectsÕ (2013) 25 Journal of Environmental Law 383, on the prolific and 
fragmented landscape of environmental policy documents. 
62 In the context of contemporary waste policy, see eg HM Government The Clean Growth Strategy: Leading 
the Way to a Low Carbon Future (2017); HM Government Industrial Strategy: Building a Britain Fit for the 
Future (2017); HM Government A Green Future: Our 25 Year Plan to Improve the Environment (2018); 
Defra Health and Harmony: The Future for Food, Farming and the Environment in a Green Brexit (2018). 
63 Scotford and Robinson, above n 61, p 397. 
64 Fisher, Lange and Scotford, above n 49, ch 11.  
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pursuant to EU law.65  The 2018 Strategy is not the new Waste Prevention Programme for 
England, and so is not quite a like-for-like comparison with the 2013 Programme.  However, 
the Strategy is the most recent statement on waste,66 and it will shape the ProgrammeÕs 
forthcoming revision.67  More broadly, waste policy is fundamental to implementing EU 
obligations on waste, and is thus partially constrained by law.  While neither the Programme 
nor the Strategy legally bind successor governments,68 high-level policy positions are more 
than frozen Ôframes of the momentÕ.69  As will be seen, they cast a shadow on future framing, 
providing some lock-in, even if policy changes quickly. 
Frame critical analysis of waste policy is particularly pertinent given the scholarshipÕs 
concern that food waste has been narrowly framed as a Ôproblem and possibilityÕ of consumer 
behaviour.70  Such accounts focus predominately on individual notions of responsibility for 
food thrown away by households.71  A rich body of literature provides sociological and 
structure-sensitive counter-frames to such narratives, highlighting how, even when 
consumers do throw away food, it does not follow that they are singularly responsible for 
it.72 Instead, broader structures drive individual food wasting practices: barriers to local and 
daily shopping; imperatives around healthy eating; food safety and hygiene; and the 
challenges of feeding a (sometimes fussy) family.73  Framing food waste as a problem of 
individual behaviour thus Ôunderestimates the extent to which individualsÕ autonomous 
action is constrained by infrastructures and socio-technical systemsÕ.74  
 
65 Directive 2008/98/EC of 19 November 2008 on waste [2008] OJ L312/3 (as amended), arts 28-29. Waste 
Prevention Programmes require Member States to identify and evaluate measures taken which break the link 
between economic growth and the environmental impacts of waste generation.  Such ÔreflexiveÕ or procedural 
obligations are commonplace in EU environmental law. Given this articleÕs concern with food waste prevention 
(how we prevent food from becoming waste) in response to overproduction and overconsumption, we are less 
concerned with government policy on waste management (what we do with ÔstuffÕ it becomes waste), and so 
our comparator for the 2018 Strategy is the Waste Prevention Programme, rather than the 2013 Waste Management 
Plan: Defra Waste Management Plan for England (London: Crown Copyright, 2013). 
66 HM Government The Strategy, above n 6, p 16. 
67 Ibid, p 77, where the implication is that 2019 will see the separate preparation of at least a new Plan, and 
presumably a new Programme.  
68 Scotford and Robinson, above n 61, pp 397Ð398, citing R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex p 
Hammersmith and Fulham LBC [1991] 1 AC 521 at 597. 
69 van Hulst and Yanow, above n 17. 
70 C Alexander, N Gregson and Z Gille ÔFood WasteÕ in A Murcott, W Belasco and P Jackson (eds) The 
Handbook of Food Research (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013); D Evans Food Waste: Home Consumption, 
Material Culture and Everyday Life (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014); M Mourad ÔRecycling, Recovering and 
Preventing ÒFood WasteÓ: Competing Solutions for Food Systems Sustainability in the United States and 
FranceÕ (2016) 126 Journal of Cleaner Production 461; D Evans, D Welch and J Swaffield ÔConstructing and 
Mobilizing Òthe ConsumerÓ: Responsibility, Consumption and the Politics of SustainabilityÕ (2017) 49 
Environment and Planning A 1396; D Welch, J Swaffield and D Evans ÔWhoÕs Responsible for Food Waste? 
Consumers, Retailers and the Food Waste Discourse Coalition in the United KingdomÕ (2018) 0 Journal of 
Consumer Culture 1; J Swaffield, D Evans and D Welch ÔProfit, Reputation and ÒDoing the Right ThingÓ: 
Convention Theory and the Problem of Food Waste in the UK Retail SectorÕ (2018) 89 Geoforum 43. 
71 See eg Institution of Mechanical Engineers ÔGlobal Food: Waste Not, Want NotÕ (London: Institution of 
Mechanical Engineers, 2013); T Quested, R Ingle and A Parry ÔHousehold Food and Drink Waste in the UK 
2012 (WRAP Final Report)Õ (Banbury, Oxford: WRAP, 2013).  
72 Evans, above n 70; Alexander, Gregson and Gille, above n 70; M OÕBrien A Crisis of Waste? (London: 
Routledge, Reprint edn, 2011); Gille, above n 7.  
73 Evans, above n 70; M Watson and A Meah ÔFood, Waste and Safety: Negotiating Conflicting Social Anxieties 
into the Practices of Domestic ProvisioningÕ (2012) 60 The Sociological Review 102. 
74 Welch, Swaffield and Evans, above n 70, p 6. 
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Consumer-centric frames also marginalise the role retailers play in driving post-retail 
ÔdownstreamÕ and pre-retail ÔupstreamÕ food waste.  Retailers shape how and where 
consumers shop, what they buy, and in what quantities, in ways which may be profitable for 
retailers but generate food waste through incentivised over purchasing, such as through large 
portion sizes, or 3-for-2 and Ôbuy one get one freeÕ (BOGOF) offers.75  Similarly, focusing 
on households tends to go hand-in-hand with paying less attention to food wasted upstream, 
and the ways waste is built into the system through normalised overproduction.76 A 
preoccupation with consumer behaviour is thus not necessarily misdirected, but 
disproportionate in terms of consumersÕ relative responsibility and because waste occurs 
elsewhere in the supply chain.  Indeed, the literature displays how retailers drive 
overproduction (and waste) within their supply chains, including on farms, particularly 
through UTPs made possible by supermarketsÕ dominant positions and market 
concentration.77  Food waste is therefore underpinned by vested economic interests in levels 
of overproduction and overconsumption which go beyond the need for surplus ÔgiveÕ. 
Therein lies the paradoxical coexistence of abundance, waste, overconsumption and hunger: 
food is produced in excess of what is needed to feed the global population, but while one-
third of all food produced is wasted and 2 billion people are overnourished, over 800 million 
people are hungry.78  Research highlighting the relationship between climates of fear among 
producers, food abundance, poverty and waste, thus provide structural and power-sensitive 
counternarratives to Ôconsumer blameÕ. Instead, food waste is symptomatic of systemic 
issues, including power asymmetries, the allocation of risks in the global economy, and a 
broken food system.79  
In response, an emergent sense of Ôdistributed responsibilityÕ has reportedly arisen, 
within which retailers accept some responsibility for food wasteÕs causes and solutions.80  
This consensus embodies a Ôwidespread recognitionÕ that food waste is systemic, requiring 
 
75 T Stuart Waste: Uncovering the Global Food Scandal (London: Penguin, 2009); C Bradshaw ÔThe Environmental 
Business Case and Unenlightened Shareholder ValueÕ (2013) 33 Legal Studies 141.  
76 Stuart, above n 75; Bloom, above n 10; M OÕBrien ÔA ÒLasting TransformationÓ of Capitalist Surplus: 
From Food Stocks to FeedstocksÕ (2012) 60 The Sociological Review 192; Gille, above n 7; Alexander, 
Gregson and Gille, above n 70; JI Macdiarmid, T Lang and A Haines ÔDown with Food WasteÕ (2016) 352 
The BMJ 1380; E Colbert ÔCauses of Food Waste in International Supply ChainsÕ (London: Feedback, 
Rockefeller Foundation, 2017). On food systems more generally, see eg J Ingram ÔA Food Systems Approach 
to Researching Food Security and Its Interactions with Global Environmental ChangeÕ (2011) 3 Food 
Security 417; C Parker and H Johnson ÔFrom Food Chains to Food Webs: Regulating Capitalist Production 
and Consumption in the Food SystemÕ (2019) 15 Annual Review of Law and Social Science (forthcoming). 
77 Stuart, above n 75; Colbert, above n 76; B Devin and C Richards ÔFood Waste, Power, and Corporate 
Social Responsibility in the Australian Food Supply ChainÕ (2018) 150 Journal of Business Ethics 199. On 
supermarket power generally, see eg D Burch and G Lawrence Supermarkets and Agri-Food Supply Chains: 
Transformations in the Production and Consumption of Foods (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2007); C Beaton-Wells and 
J Paul-Taylor ÔProblematising SupermarketÐSupplier Relations: Dual Perspectives of Competition and 
FairnessÕ (2017) 26 Griffith Law Review 28. 
78 Gustavsson and others, above n 8; above FAO, n 8; E Holt-Gimnez and others ÔWe Already Grow 
Enough Food for 10 Billion People É and Still CanÕt End HungerÕ (2012) 36 Journal of Sustainable 
Agriculture 595. 
79 Gille, above n 7; T Lang ÔFood Waste Is the Symptom, Not the ProblemÕ (The Conversation, 25 June 2013) at 
http://theconversation.com/food-waste-is-the-symptom-not-the-problem-15432 (last accessed 4 July 2019). 
80 Evans, Welch and Swaffield, above n 70; Swaffield, Evans and Welch, above n 70; Welch, Swaffield and 
Evans, above n 70. 
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Ôcollaboration between actors across the food chainÕ.81  This consensus resonates somewhat 
with critiques of food waste as an individualised consumer problem, but to what extent is 
distributed responsibility reflected in policy?  Informed by the literature, frame critical 
analysis reveals limitations in EnglandÕs fresh approach to food waste, to which we now turn. 
 
 
FOOD WASTE FRAMES IN THE STRATEGY 
 
While Ôdistributed responsibilityÕ for food waste was not reflected in the 2013 Programme, it 
has gained some purchase in the 2018 Strategy, with frame critical analysis revealing a shift 
towards a more elaborated and sophisticated frame.  This is seen in three main ways: first, by 
acknowledging food waste as a specific rather than generic waste problem; second, by 
reframing economic growth as part of the problem, rather than the goal; and third, by 
assuming a role for law and regulation.  However, whether the Strategy moves to a whole-
systems, resource management frame is unclear.  Furthermore, rather than reducing surplus, 
the Strategy shifts the burden of redistribution away from the state and retailers onto charities 
and farmers, in turn revealing a mismatch between its prognostic and diagnostic frame.  
 
Food waste as a specific (rather than generic) waste problem 
 
Food waste receives special treatment in the new Strategy by way of its own chapter,82 in 
contrast to the Programme, which framed food waste as a generic waste problem.  Whether 
the Strategy moves toward a resource management frame is harder to assess.  As will be 
explained, fragmented approaches may restrict consideration of the special resource 
implications of food, although the commitment to impact-based targets is significant.   
Understanding food waste as a generic waste problem is a familiar framing approach, 
using pre-existing frameworks to understand ÔnewÕ problems. Bardwell notes the tendency 
to construct environmental problems (here, food waste) as ÔlikeÕ others (waste), to be solved 
by analogy.83 However, scholarship highlights how generic waste approaches can be 
restrictive.  Framing waste as a waste management problem (what we do with stuff once it 
becomes waste), rather than a resource management problem (how do we produce and 
manage resources to prevent them from becoming waste), has led to end-of-pipe approaches 
which tackle the symptoms, not the causes, of waste, and shift blame to those at the end of 
the chain (especially consumers).84  Similarly, generic waste management approaches fail to 
accommodate the distinct challenges arising from food, a resource which is profoundly 
important to humanity and central to everyday life, but also often perishable.85  Important 
 
81 Evans, Welch and Swaffield, above n 70, p 1404. 
82 HM Government The Strategy, above n 6, ch 5.  
83 Bardwell, above n 23.  
84 Scotford, above n 1; Alexander, Gregson and Gille, above n 70; Bradshaw, above n 5. 
85 Bradshaw, above n 5; Ferrando and Mansuy, above n 5. On the particularities of food, see eg Parker and 
Johnson, above n 76; H Johnson International Agricultural Law and Policy: A Rights-Based Approach to Food Security 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2018). 
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accounts of the problem, and the ethicality of the material produced, are liable to be excluded 
when food waste is framed like any other waste problem. 
The Programme outlined food as a Ôpriority materialÕ, indicating that food waste 
needed urgent (not special) attention.86  The sheer number and breadth of priority materials 
leads one to question what analytical work was done by singling out so many.87  After briefly 
listing pre-existing interventions (discussed below),88 food waste was then dotted around the 
Programme in ways which implied the generalisability of waste prevention approaches, as 
opposed to the distinct challenges of food (Ômany of the actions outlined are relevant across 
sectors and materialsÕ).89  The Programme thus made no overt or implied acknowledgement 
that food might be different. Furthermore, apparent business cases for waste prevention 
(discussed further, below) were exemplified by a number of resource efficient business 
models.90 However, these made little sense applied to food. Keeping food for longer, 
repairing, borrowing and hiring food, or buying it second hand, are either nonsensical in the 
context of perishables, or involve logistical and temporal challenges which undermine the 
ease of solutions.91  The indiscriminate application of generic approaches to specific waste 
problems displays the problems created by a restrictive frame.  
By contrast, the new StrategyÕs food waste chapter pays lip service to treating food 
waste as a specific rather than generic problem.  The likely reason for this is the obligation, 
pursuant to the revised Waste Framework Directive, to adopt food waste prevention plans.92  
The result is a more holistic account, with food waste measures grouped together and 
subdivided by reference to the different challenges that upstream/business and 
downstream/consumer food waste pose.  In doing so, the chapter begins to enable a whole-
system approach more in-keeping with a resource management frame.  This was more 
difficult in the ProgrammeÕs Ôpriority materialsÕ approach, where thinking was structured 
around what different actors across multiple sectors could do to address various types of 
waste,93 rather than what might be done by relevant actors to address a specific challenge. 
However, a fragmented approach, without efforts to join-up thinking, restricts the 
StrategyÕs resource-based appreciation of the problem.  The leading diagram in the StrategyÕs 
food waste chapter displays the problems of not doing so.94  The figure depicts the sector-
specific contributions to the UKÕs 10.2 million tonnes of post-farmgate food waste in 2015: 
 
86 HM Government The Programme, above n 13, pp 22Ð23. 
87 They are food, textiles, paper and board, plastics, electronic and electrical equipment, other items for reuse, 
built environment (including construction and demolition and facilities managements) and chemical and 
healthcare. 
88 HM Government The Programme, above n 13, p 22. 
89 Ibid, pp 11Ð12, 22, 26, 30 and 40.  
90 The examples given are retained ownership models (such as take-back schemes), customer loyalty schemes 
(such as bicycle shops offering mechanical services and upgrades), or lease-based services (such as car hire 
models like ZipCar), see ibid, p 27. 
91 As seen with food redistribution, where the perishability of food creates particular challenges.  See C 
Alexander and C Smaje ÔSurplus Retail Food Redistribution: An Analysis of a Third Sector ModelÕ (2008) 52 
Resources, Conservation and Recycling 1290.  
92 Directive (EU) 2018/851 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 amending Directive 
2008/98/EC on waste, art 1(22)(c)(2a). This obligation will be retained law when the UK leaves the EU, see 
the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 and HM Government The Strategy, above n 6, p 113. 
93 HM Government The Programme, above n 13, pp 25Ð44. 
94 HM Government The Strategy, above n 6, p 100.  
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households 7.1m tonnes (pictured: house), manufacturing 1.85m (factory), hospitality and 
food services 1m (hotel), and retail 0.2m (supermarket trolley).  This has the problematic 
tendency to conflate where food waste occurs with its causes, obscuring the structural 
context of (for example) household food waste.95  Quite remarkably, this visual frame omits 
how food is (for now) grown or reared on farms, excluding the agricultural sector and the 
estimated 3.6m tonnes of food wasted on farms.96  This is partly a function of using the post-
farmgate data, preferred due to nervousness about on-farm estimates.97  But the data gap is 
partly due to the focus on consumer waste, together with retailersÕ resistance to reporting.98  
An image which ignores the agricultural context is thus neither a neutral, nor complete, 
frame.  This would be more significant were powers not being sought to tackle on-farm food 
waste, but fragmented approaches with divergent frames across a complex and interrelated 
supply could impede success and restrict a resource management approach (all discussed 
below).  
Another example is the StrategyÕs commitment to consult on mandating separate 
food waste collection from 2023 onwards.99  This is found in Chapter 3 on waste 
management (not Chapter 5, on food waste).100  This is a natural result of the StrategyÕs 
structure, which looks sequentially at product life stages (production, consumption, end of 
life/waste management, in Chapters 1-3, respectively) followed by special topics waste crime 
(Chapter 4) and then food waste. This is not problematic in itself; the framing literature 
suggests that problems have to be broken down.  But in the face of fragmentation, efforts 
must be made to join-up thinking.  This involves reflecting on how downstream policies 
affect upstream behaviour, and vice versa.  Separate food waste collection aims to support 
diverting the inedible fractions of food, like coffee grounds and fruit stones, from landfill, in 
particular to anaerobic digestion (AD), an energy recovery process where bio-material is 
broken down to produce renewable biogas and fertiliser.  However, AD subsidies, combined 
with minimal support for food redistribution, incentivise the removal of edible food from 
the supply chain; food which ought to be redistributed early enough to feed people gets sent 
instead to AD.101 Nonetheless, the Strategy makes no mention of the relationship between 
food redistribution, subsidies for AD, and mandatory separate waste collection.  While the 
food waste chapter documents new support for redistribution (discussed below), it is 
disappointing to see these issues siphoned off into separate chapters, and the relationship 
between them not explicitly recognised.  More broadly, this shows how past frames, rather 
than being frozen frames of the moment, can cast long shadows, and the manifestations of 
a previously restrictive frame can be difficult to unpick: with a waste management frame, AD 
is a beast which we must now continue to feed.  This all casts doubt on the StrategyÕs 
ambition, and highlights its restrictiveness, evidenced particularly by the headline but non-
 
95 Alexander, Gregson and Gille, above n 70.  
96 B Bajzelj, W McManus and A Parry ÔFood Waste in Primary Production in the UK (Final Report)Õ (WRAP 
2019). 
97 Ibid. 
98 See eg Stuart, above n 75; Colbert, above n 76. 
99 HM Government The Strategy, above n 6, pp 9 and 70. 
100 Ibid, pp 70Ð71. 
101 Bradshaw, above n 5. 
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binding waste management target of eliminating food waste sent to landfill by 2030, likely 
(but perhaps not desirably) to be achieved through AD.  The Strategy does not fully embrace 
a more elaborated resource management frame.   
The StrategyÕs commitment to move away from weight-based to impact-based 
(including carbon emissions) targets and reporting is more in keeping with a resource-based 
frame.102  Indeed, this is central to the Ôfundamental shiftÕ away from a focus on waste, toward 
a focus on resources.103  This proposal is buried in the final chapter on monitoring,104 and is 
not food-specific, but it may be especially important in the context of food. Food is a 
relatively light material with high environmental impact, so that measuring tonnage masks 
impacts, particularly given the embedded carbon costs of food waste (a fifth of UK carbon 
emissions are associated with food and drink, especially production).105  Nonetheless, a 
resource frame means ensuring food is eaten, and climate imperatives ought not mask 
broader distributional challenges in the context of food.  Renewable energy subsides for AD 
amount to a codified preference for profitable waste management over charitable food 
redistribution.106  It is thus significant that social and economic indicators are also on the 
agenda.107 
The food waste chapter is, at a general level, a noteworthy frame shift, but it is not 
without restrictions.  Whether this moves towards a more elaborated resource approach is 
more difficult to assess.  As discussed in the following sections, there are additional tells in 
the StrategyÕs understanding of the causes of food waste and its solutions. 
 
 
Broadening the diagnostic frame: beyond waste as an economic opportunity 
 
The 2018 Strategy is broader in its account of the causes of food waste, adopting a less 
restrictive diagnostic frame than the 2013 Programme.  We see this through three 
interconnected themes.  First, the Programme framed waste as an economic opportunity, so 
that waste prevention can (must?) contribute to economic growth, whereas the Strategy 
positions growth as part of the problem.  Second, with a move away from the focus on 
business cases for waste prevention, the Strategy acknowledges what the Programme actively 
ignores: the existence, and structural causes, of excess quantities of food.  Third, this permits 
the StrategyÕs inclusion of a broader range of actors and values which the ProgrammeÕs 
restricted approach threw into shadow.  
 
Growth: from goal to problem  
The ProgrammeÕs overriding conceptualisation of waste was not so much as an economic 
problem, but as an economic opportunity, so that waste prevention can (must?) contribute 
to economic growth:  ÔA key priority for the Government is to boost growth in the economy 
 
102 HM Government The Strategy, above n 6, pp 19 and 36. 
103 Ibid, p 138. 
104 HM Government The Strategy, above n 6, ch 8. 
105 Ibid, pp 10 and 99. 
106 Bradshaw, above n 5.  
107 HM Government The Strategy, above n 6, p 17.  
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whilst continuing to improve the environmentÉ Moving towards a more resource efficient, 
circular economy offers scope for innovation, sustainable growth and saving money, as well 
as reducing the impact on the environment.Õ108  Where the Programme thus framed growth 
as the goal of waste prevention, the Strategy frames growth as part of the problem:  
 
[O]ur growth over many decades has been over-reliant on exploiting finite natural 
resources whose depletion inevitably leaves future generations poorer É Material 
resources are at the heart of our economy, and we consume them in large quantities.  
They allow us to meet our basic human needs as well as generate economic growth 
and social value.  But our use of resources is unsustainable.109 
 
We see more nuanced manifestations of this frame-shift in the contrast between natural 
capital and resource efficiency.  Within the StrategyÕs overarching natural capital approach, 
waste is framed primarily as an economic, social and environmental risk, reflected in the 
exploitation of depleting stock of finite natural capital and its underlying economic and social 
value.110  If not aiming towards the total maintenance of resources, it looks toward not taking 
them for granted, by contemplating moving away from models of exploitation: ÔNatural 
capital is one of our most valuable assets. The air we breathe, the water we drink the land we 
live on, and the stock of material resources we use in our daily lives are at the heart of our 
economy, our society and our way of life.  We must not take these for grantedÕ.111 
Risk and conservation under natural capital should be contrasted with the 
ProgrammeÕs focus on economic opportunities in using resources efficiently: 
 
Resource efficiency means using the EarthÕs limited resources in a sustainable manner 
while minimising negative impacts on the environment É A resource efficient 
economy is one where fewer resources are used to produce more, making the most of 
those resources by É extracting maximum value from them while in use, then 
recovering and regenerating product and materials at the end of each service life.112 
 
Here, the exploitation or use (rather than conservation) of limited (not finite) resources was 
front and centre.  Even though the Programme acknowledged the need to use fewer 
resources, the emphasis was still on producing more, displaying the importance of production 
and consumption to growth. 
A body of critical literature provides scepticism as to whether less, no, or negative 
growth are contemplatable within natural capital approaches.113  Natural capital may simply 
be waste as an economic opportunity repackaged, with the frame-shift more apparent than 
real.  However, this coincides with the StrategyÕs departure from the ProgrammeÕs restrictive, 
 
108 HM Government The Programme, above n 13, p 5. 
109 HM Government The Strategy, above n 6, p 15. 
110 Ibid (emphasis added). 
111 Ibid, p 7. 
112 HM Government The Programme, above n 13, pp 8Ð9 (emphasis added). 
113 See eg L Fisher, B Lange and E Scotford Environmental Law: Text, Cases & Materials (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2nd edn, 2019) pp 744Ð757. 
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business case-approach to diagnosing the causes of waste, where  wasre prevention win-win 
opportunities are not seen or grasped. 
 
From business cases to structural overproduction? 
Within the growth-orientated frame, the Programme constructs barriers to waste prevention 
in business case terms, as a result excluding broader accounts of the causes of food waste.  
Waste was an economic externality, not fully priced in the market because (i) the business 
cases for waste prevention are either unknown or underestimated, or exist in the medium to 
long-term, rather than short-term, or (ii) the financial benefits of waste prevention are split 
across a number of actors within the supply chain.114  The Programme also recast 
informational and behavioural challenges in business case terms, receiving a coat of win-win 
gloss when characterised, respectively, as occurring because the financial benefits are 
ÔunknownÕ, or Ôthe long-term É benefits are underestimated, the risks overestimated, and 
upfront costs ignored over long-term benefits.Õ115   
The Programme thus framed waste diagnostically as arising from slightly (rather than 
fundamentally) misaligned incentives, or informational (as opposed to power) asymmetries.  
The ProgrammeÕs prognostic attribution (discussed further, below) was also constructed in 
similar terms, where the business case for waste prevention acted as the conceptual hook, or 
rhetorical device, through which waste prevention as an economic opportunity would be 
operationalised.  Because Ôwaste costs moneyÕ, reducing waste Ôcan help save businesses 
moneyÕ; like Ôsustainable economic growth and environmental improvementÕ, they can Ôgo 
hand in handÕ and Ôare not mutually exclusiveÕ.116  As explained above, these examples made 
little sense applied to food.  And when the Programme did give examples of food waste 
prevention win-wins, they were opportunities for consumers which may not translate into 
financial gains for businesses.117  This is because it largely goes against retailersÕ business 
models to encourage consumers to buy less.118  Indeed, the Programme walked a fine line 
between pointing to financial gains for consumers while never explicitly mentioning the 
importance of encouraging people to buy less food, presumably because the growth goal 
restricted contemplation of hitting retailer profits.  This was potentially implicit in the 
ProgrammeÕs plea that consumers Ômeal planÕ,119 but this is subtle.  Read with the broader 
context of economic opportunity, there was little scope for contemplating the possibility of 
consuming or buying less, especially when waste prevention was characterised in terms of 
Ôhow products are designed and manufactured, what we buy, how we use and maintain 
products, and what we do when we have finished with themÕ.120  Not whether we produce, or 
whether we buy.  
 
114 HM Government The Programme, above n 13, pp 11Ð12. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid, pp 8 and 28. 
117 Ibid, p 42. 
118 Bradshaw, above n 75.  
119 HM Government The Programme, above n 13, p 42. 
120 Defra Government Review of Waste Policy in England 2011 (London: Crown Copyright, 2011) para 70 (emphasis 
added). 
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Unsurprisingly, therefore, the Programme made no mention of normalised and 
systematic overproduction.  Indeed, the business case, as the central rhetorical weapon in the 
frame, actively restricted this.  As the scholarship shows, business case logicÑthe idea that 
behaving responsibly pays (and is even easy)Ñpreserves and reinforces the status quo, so 
that questions about the fundamentals of a particular industry model remain unasked, and 
structural changes are difficult to contemplate.121  Reflection on overproduction and 
prevailing power structures is actively excluded by diagnostic framing shaped by business 
cases.  Indeed, it is telling that an intervention to tackle supply chain power imbalances, in 
place at the time of the ProgrammeÕs writing, was not even mentioned.  The Groceries 
Supply Code of Practice (the Code), now enforced by the Groceries Code Adjudicator (GCA, 
discussed below), requires retailers deal with suppliers fairly, and seeks to tackle the adverse 
effects on competition arising from the structure of the food supply chain.122  Any role the 
Code might play in food waste reduction is thus tangential to its primary aims, but its 
exclusion from the Programme displays the restricted diagnostic frame: food waste as a side 
effect of power imbalances is actively excluded, with the business case frame obscuring 
complex structure-sensitive accounts of food waste in the literature, and failing to 
contemplate the existence of overproduction as problematic. 
Significantly, the new Strategy explicitly acknowledges surplus in the system as a 
problem: ÔGrowing excess food that no one eats damages the EarthÕs ecosystems.Õ123  
Admitting, even in passing, that there is excess in the system, and that this is problematic, is 
an immediately broader and more sophisticated diagnostic frame.  Structural causes can at 
least get a look in, with the Strategy recognising that food waste sometimes arises from UTPs 
made possible by imbalances of power.124  Similarly, the Strategy frames household food 
waste not as an individualised consumer behaviour problem, but potentially as a retailer 
problem, with (as discussed below) businesses constructed as the primary target of policies 
addressing household food waste.125  This implicitly acknowledges that consumer practice 
takes place within a structural context.  While the Programme did highlight the role retailers 
may play in reducing household food waste,126 structural causes were then forgotten when 
the Programme highlighted how consumers might better manage their food consumption 
practices.127 The Strategy is thus comparatively more elaborated in its account of the causes 
of the problem: open to the existence of overproduction and overconsumption and its 
structural causes.  Given the framing literature suggests structural accounts are often 
excluded, it is perhaps remarkable that they have found their way in. 
 
 
121 Bradshaw, above n 75; Swaffield, Evans and Welch, above n 70. 
122 The Code is contained in the Groceries (Supply Chain Practices) Market Investigation Order 2009, Sch 1; 
see also the Groceries Code Adjudicator Act 2013. 
123 HM Government The Strategy, above n 6, p 10. 
124 Ibid, p 105. 
125 Ibid, pp 107Ð109. 
126 See HM Government The Programme, above n 13, eg p 19.  
127 Ibid, p 42. 
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Beyond economic actors and values 
The ProgrammeÕs frame also pushed certain actors and values into the background, in ways 
which were more restrictive than the Strategy.  Businesses, and business interests, were 
foregrounded in the Programme, as were actors (re)constructed in economic terms. The 
Programme put emphasis on resource efficiency as a contributor to growth, partly because 
it saw businesses as dependent on resources, so that resource inefficiency was a threat to 
competitiveness: ÔOur economy and businesses depend on global trade and resources É 
using resources more efficiently will put us in a strong position to win the global raceÕ.128  
When speaking to other constituents, the Programme recast them economically, advising 
civil society, for example, to Ôthink like a businessÕ.129 Similarly, win-wins around household 
food waste reduction in the Programme (above) spoke to people just as consumers (rather 
than also as citizens).  The Programme thus pushed certain reasons for acting out of 
contemplation, and in turn excluded important alternative practices (or downplayed their 
importance, by prioritising commercial value).130  The food sharing platform OLIO, for 
example, explicitly does not have a Ôbusiness modelÕ (or at least not yet).131  Food 
redistribution charities such as FareShare produce social good beyond the nutritional and 
financial benefits of redistributed food, where communal meals create communities and 
reduce loneliness.132  The restrictiveness of a frame which prioritises economic values and 
actors is emphasised by the literature, such as critiques of Ôgreen consumerismÕ (emphasising 
consumption rather than non-consumption) or the limitations of seeking environmental 
change through the market.133 
The new Strategy is, in the framing language, comparatively elaborated, with both 
economic growth and social value (not just economic value) relevant, as seen in the quotes 
above, and the inclusion of future generations brings inter-generational equity into the 
picture.134  This also informs different approaches to the reasons for, and goals of, state 
intervention.  Under the Programme, government would intervene only to correct Ômarket 
failuresÕ, with its role limited to setting Ôthe conditions and guidelines that allow the market, 
businesses, local authorities and people to É propel us towards a more É sustainable 
economyÕ.135  In contrast, under the Strategy, state interventions would instead need to adhere 
to at least one of five principles, the first of which is to allow people Ôto do the right thingÕ,136 
rather than just save (or make) money.  The Strategy talks of ÔcitizenÕ (rather than just 
 
128 Ibid, p 10.  
129 Ibid, p 56. 
130 See M Blake ÔThe Multiple Ontologies of Surplus FoodÕ (Europe Now, 7 May 2019) at 
https://www.europenowjournal.org/2019/05/06/the-multiple-ontologies-of-surplus-food accessed (last 
accessed 4 July 2019). 
131 Quoting (with permission) M Barsties (Head of Food Waste Heroes Programme, OLIO) in response to 
questions at ÔFuture Food SymposiumÕ, Nottingham University Business School, University of Nottingham, 
20 June 2019.  See also OLIO ÔAboutÕ at https://olioex.com/about/ (last accessed 4 July 2019).  
132 See eg FareShare ÔOur Impact: More than MealsÕ at https://fareshare.org.uk/what-we-do/our-impact/ 
(last accessed 4 July 2019). 
133 See eg M Sagoff Price, Principle, and the Environment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
134 HM Government The Strategy, above n 6, p 132. 
135 HM Government The Programme, above n 13, p 16. 
136 HM Government The Strategy, above n 6, p 17. 
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consumer) action on food waste, thus speaking to peopleÕs values (not just their pockets).137  
This boundary-work is familiar from the literature, where frames can identify problems as 
ÔthisÕ, but Ônot thatÕ.  The Strategy is more elaborated: ÔthisÕ, but Ôalso thisÕ.   
These might seem like linguistic subtleties, but these shifts may signal a move away 
from market-dominated approaches with a distinct ideological heritage.  Indeed, problem 
frames are Ôcurrents in the stream of political discourseÕ.  Of course, while natural capital may 
be Ôeconomic opportunityÕ in new clothes, the broader diagnostic frame explored above has 
led to changes in the assumed responsibility of the state for addressing food waste.  However, 
while the Strategy has much by way of contemplated action, there remains an ongoing 
reluctance to intervene against powerful interests.  As discussed below, where business cases 
in the Programme underpinned a preference for government Ôstepping backÕ, their absence 
in the Strategy paves the way for government Ôstepping back inÕ.  But not against 
supermarkets, and not against overproduction. 
 
 
Broadening the prognostic frame: government Ôsteps back inÕ? 
 
Central to the waste policies are familiar but fundamental debates about the role of the state 
in addressing environmental and other social problems.138 As discussed below, the 2013 
Programme adopted a clear line of diagnostic and prognostic framing, where waste as an 
economic opportunity, exemplified by business cases for waste prevention, limited the need 
for government intervention.  More cynically, this frame barely disguised a broader economic 
agenda seeking to shift responsibility for all sorts of problems away from the state.  In this 
hollowed out governance space, distributed (and outsourced) responsibility for all, was more 
akin to a vacuum of responsibility for none.  In the 2018 Strategy, government purports to 
Ôstep back inÕ, and unlike the Programme, acknowledges retailer-driven overproduction as 
part of the problem.  But the StrategyÕs broader diagnostic frame is not matched by its 
prescriptions, with a focus on redistributing rather reducing surplus, and responsibility 
shifted away from the state and retailers on to charities and farmers.  So while the ÔelephantÕ 
of overproduction was not even allowed Ôin the roomÕ under the Programme, under the 
Strategy, the elephant has been granted admittance, but (as the metaphorical idiom provides), 
it is still being ignored. 
 
Government Ôsteps backÕ: vacuum of responsibility under the Programme 
It is widely acknowledged that responsibility for addressing food waste should be spread 
(ÔdistributedÕ) across the supply chain, with interventions at multiple levels by a range of 
actors.  The Programme was thus largely uncontroversial in declaring that ÔeveryoneÕ has Ôa 
part to playÕ in waste prevention.139  But the Programme then declared that Ôno single actor 
 
137 On the distinction between consumer and citizen mobilisation and the limitations of the former in 
building sustainable communities, see eg A Dobson Citizenship and the Environment (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003).  
138 See eg R Eckersley The Green State: Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004). 
139 HM Government The Programme, above n 13, p 12. 
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has overall responsibility or oversightÕ,140 and that a more sustainable economy Ôcan and 
should be delivered with limited government intervention as industry responds to the clear business 
case for action.Õ141  This underpinned DefraÕs later statement that it would Ôstep backÕ from 
waste,142 with the Minister recently describing food waste legislation as Ôusing a sledgehammer 
to crack a nutÕ.143  
The Programme displayed a clear line of diagnostic and prognostic thought.  Waste 
as an economic opportunity, exemplified by business cases for waste prevention, limited the 
need for government intervention.  More cynically, it is unclear whether minimal government 
intervention flowed from the problem definition of waste as an economic opportunity, or, if 
small-state Ôsolution-mindednessÕ was the real goal which (reverse) engineered the problemÕs 
definition.  Was a limited role for the state the (ideological) tail wagging the dog?  Central to 
shifting responsibility away from the state was the business case which, as a central rhetorical 
device, displays how frames are as much weapons of advocacy as they are reflections of 
empirical realities.144  High-level policy frames inevitably form part of broader political 
agendas, and the framing literature is clear that pre-existing ideologies shape problem 
definition.  In this sense, the Programme was perhaps not really about waste at all, but a 
broader concern to drive economic growth through a (mostly) non-interventionist state, 
(largely) irrespective of policy area.  Either way, this shrunk government responsibility for 
particular aspects of waste (food waste prevention) on the basis of a restrictive diagnostic 
account as to the causes of food waste.  In doing so, it excluded the systematic consideration 
of alternatives, removing from contemplation legislative measures which long featured on 
campaignerÕs wish lists.145  
The ProgrammeÕs role for government in encouraging and supporting action through 
collaborative approaches146 resulted in the relative hollowing out of food waste prevention 
law and regulation.  The limited exception is the Groceries Code.  As above, any role the 
Code might play in food waste is tangential to its primary aims.  However, the GCAÕs ability 
to intervene in the monopolistic conditions which allow for UTPs has been noted as capable 
of supporting the reduction of on-farm food waste, notably in respect of demand 
forecasting.147  But the Code is not mentioned in the Programme, confirming the 
restrictiveness of its diagnostic and prognostic frames.  Otherwise, food waste prevention 
has largely been outsourced to WRAP (the Waste and Resources Action Programme, a 
charity which receives most of its income from central government and devolved 
 
140 Ibid. 
141 Ibid, p 16 (emphasis added). 
142 House of Commons Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee Waste Management in England HC 241 
(2015), paras 3-5.  
143 House of Commons Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee, above n 16. 
144 See also Stokes, above n 33.  
145 Stuart, above n 75, has long campaigned for mandatory food waste reporting. 
146 HM Government The Programme, above n 13, pp 5Ð6. 
147 House of Lords EU Committee Counting the Cost of Food Waste: EU Food Waste Prevention HL 154 (2014) para 
99. 
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administrations).148  WRAP administers perhaps the most high-profile food waste 
intervention, Love Food Hate Waste (a consumer information campaign),149 as well as voluntary 
agreements, such as the Courtauld Commitments with food retailers and businesses.150  
These agreements include relatively unambitious non-binding targets, with Courtauld 2025 
aiming to reduce per capita UK food waste by 20 per cent between 2015-2025.151  However, 
voluntary approaches rely overwhelmingly on business cases which, as explained above, are 
not necessarily contrary to structures that drive overproduction. Indeed, literature highlights 
the limits of the Ômarket for virtueÕ, providing scepticism as to the ability of voluntary, 
collaborative and market-orientated approaches to dismantle vested interests in ongoing 
levels of overproduction and waste.152 The ProgrammeÕs prognostic frame was therefore 
highly restricted by actively excluding legislative interventions.  
Read with the ProgrammeÕs removal of oversight for anyone (including government), 
this casts doubt on the meaningfulness of Ôdistributed responsibilityÕ.  As Swaffield et al show, 
the perceived business case for tackling food waste was central to supermarkets accepting 
some responsibility.153  But limited retailer responsibility under business case approaches, 
combined with no single actor having overall oversight, is more akin to a vacuum of 
responsibility.  In the same way that accountability to all is accountability to none, distributed 
responsibility for all is responsibility for none.  This somewhat empty prognostic frame may 
(in framing language) have ÔresonatedÕ or Ôtaken holdÕ with powerful actors precisely because 
it helps them escape meaningful reformatory responsibility for food waste.  At the same time, 
the rhetoric of Ôstepping backÕ obscured how government was (and still is) subsidising AD, 
and thus responsive to the needs of for-profit waste management and a broader bias towards 
energy.154 Saying government had Ôstepped backÕ was thus disingenuous.  Rather, government 
had stepped back from legislating on certain aspects of waste, merely supporting 
collaborative and voluntary approaches to addressing retailers and waste prevention, while 
supporting economic interests in food waste management by legislating for AD subsidies.  
This false dichotomy between Ôstepping backÕ and Ôstepping back inÕ is, as explained below, 
not entirely absent in the StrategyÕs mismatched prognostic and diagnostic frames. 
 
148 WRAP ÔWRAP UKÕ (9 October 2012) at http://www.wrap.org.uk/about-us/governance (last accessed 4 
July 2019), WRAP ÔAnnual Financial Review (2017-2018)Õ at http://review-2018.wrap.org.uk/financial-
review/ (last accessed 4 July 2019). 
149 WRAP ÔAbout Us | Love Food Hate WasteÕ at https://www.lovefoodhatewaste.com/about-us (last 
accessed 4 July 2019).  See also B Turner Taste, Waste and the New Materiality of Food (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2018) pp 160Ð163. 
150 WRAP ÔCourtauld 2025Õ (19 February 2018) at http://www.wrap.org.uk/food-drink/business-food-
waste/courtauld-2025  (last accessed 4 July 2019). 
151 Compare the 20 per cent by 2025 target with the UN Sustainable Development Goal of reducing per 
capita food waste by 50 per cent by 2030.  See also the redistribution targets discussed by Bradshaw, above n 
5, at fn 51. 
152 See eg D Vogel The Market for Virtue: The Potential and Limits of Corporate Social Responsibility (Washington 
DC: Brookings Institution, 2006); N Gunningham ÔCorporate Environmental Responsibility: Law and the 
Limits of VoluntarismÕ in D McBarnet, T Campbell and A Voiculescu (eds) The New Corporate Accountability: 
Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Cf with eg S Piras 
and others ÔUnfair Trading Practice Regulation and Voluntary Agreements Targeting Food Waste: A Policy 
Assessment in Select EU Member StatesÕ (REFRESH, 2018). 
153 Swaffield, Evans and Welch, above n 70. 
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Government Ôsteps back inÕ under the Strategy? 
Government purportedly Ôstepping backÕ from waste under the Programme was heavily 
criticised by the House of Commons Environment, Farming and Rural Affairs (EFRA) 
Committee, who argued that Defra should take the Ôlead role and responsibilityÕ for waste 
policy.155  It is therefore notable that, where the 2013 Programme started from a position of 
limited-to-no role for the state, the 2018 Strategy acknowledges the need to actively ÔprovideÕ 
incentives for waste prevention, Ôthrough regulatory or economic instruments if necessary 
and appropriateÕ.156  Legislative proposals on the table under the Strategy, when they were 
previously off the table under the Programme, is an ostensibly significant frame shift.  
However, rather than seeking to reduce surplus, these proposals shift the burden of 
redistribution onto charities and farmers, and even the taxpayer and consumers.  The Strategy 
thus displays a restrictive prognostic frame which does not match the its own more 
elaborated diagnosis.  This is seen in three main respects.  First, the centrality of redistribution 
to the StrategyÕs overall approach, and related problems with the waste hierarchy.  Second, a 
fragmented approach to regulating food waste and UTPs.  Third, the continued outsourcing, 
and limited distribution, of responsibility for downstream food waste. 
 
Redistribution and the waste hierarchy 
Food redistribution is central to the StrategyÕs action on upstream food waste.157  It 
outlines measures to support charitable redistribution of surplus food, but also recasts 
potentially broader interventions in terms of the narrower supportive role they might play 
for redistribution.  A £15m pilot food redistribution fund, open and administered by WRAP 
just prior to the StrategyÕs launch, supports, for example, redistribution hubs and gleaning 
networks.158  The Strategy also pledges to consult on surplus food donation and 
redistribution obligations for food businesses, similar to those adopted in France,159 but 
recently rejected in England.160  Combined, these measures seek to avoid diverting edible 
food to AD, although the Strategy makes no mention of  the subsidies incentivising this.161  
In assessing whether the fund ÔlevelsÕ the economic playing field between charitable 
 
155 House of Commons Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee above n 142, para 22. 
156 HM Government The Strategy, above n 6, p 17. 
157 Ibid, p 100Ð104. 
158 Ibid, pp 100Ð102.  Gleaning networks involve volunteers harvesting food that, often for economic 
reasons, would not otherwise be harvested.  
159 M Mourad and S Finn ÔOpinion | FranceÕs Ban on Food Waste Three Years LaterÕ (Food Tank, 19 June 
2019) at https://foodtank.com/news/2019/06/opinion-frances-ban-on-food-waste-three-years-later/ (last 
accessed 4 July 2019). 
160 House of Commons Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee Food Waste in England HC 429 
(2017). 
161 HM Government The Strategy, above n 6, p 101; Bradshaw, above n 5. 
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redistribution and AD subsidies,162 one might compare the £15m redistribution fund with 
the reported £160m supporting AD.163  
The redistribution of surplus food does not necessarily address overproduction, and 
may simply support the dispersal, rather than reduction, of excess in the system.  Food waste 
prevention targets and mandatory reporting obligations, on which the Strategy also promises 
to consult,164 may assist in ensuring that redistribution obligations do not become alternative 
means of dealing with unmitigated quantities of surplus.  But as the Strategy states, Ôour 
priority is to stop surplus food from becoming wasteÕ,165 (rather than to minimise surplus 
itself).  This reveals the restrictions of the StrategyÕs prognostic frame.  The diagnosis 
identifies excess as part of the causes of food waste, but redistribution addresses its 
symptoms, not causes.  Indeed, three years after certain French retailers were required to 
enter into donation agreements with redistribution organisations, the measures, while 
increasing the amounts of food donated (not all of which is eventually eaten), have failed to 
address the underlying problem of overproduction, and may, perversely, have lessened the 
incentive to do so.166 
Additionally, this narrow prognostic frame of intervention shifts responsibility for 
food waste away from businesses and the state; confirms the burden already on charities for 
redirecting donated food; and makes new asks of the taxpayer.  The £15 million 
redistribution fund, by making it easier for retailers to deal with their waste, partly amounts 
to a transfer of public money (via charities and redistribution) to supermarkets, which some 
might see as an indirect form of Ôcorporate welfareÕ.167  For those seeing the causes of hunger 
residing in poverty, inequality and a state which is responsive to corporate rather than social 
needs, this may seem misplaced.  Indeed, if redistribution becomes more than a temporary 
stop-gap to the coexistence of surplus, hunger and waste, and the StrategyÕs proposed legal 
obligations institutionalise redistribution as a solution to Ôfood povertyÕ, then this may divert 
attention away from the role of the state in addressing the causes of both poverty and 
surplus.168  While the language and rhetoric of the StrategyÕs diagnostic frame is thus much 
less overtly business-oriented than the Programme, there is much within its prognostic frame 
to appeal to retailers and, notwithstanding the promised sense of government intervention, 
proponents of a small(er) state.  The StrategyÕs focus on charitable redistribution may reflect 
 
162 FareShare ÔFareShare Encourages a Level Playing Field for Food DisposalÕ (8 September 2015) at 
http://www.fareshare.org.uk/fareshare-encourages-level-playing-field-for-food-disposal/ (last accessed 4 July 
2019). 
163 H Sheffield ÔThousands of Tonnes of Edible Food Are Being Diverted from Feeding the HungryÕ The 
Independent (9 February 2016) at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/uk-government-paying-
millions-to-turn-food-waste-into-energy-while-needy-go-hungry-a6863401.html (last accessed 4 July 2019).  
164 HM Government The Strategy, above n 6, p 103. 
165 Ibid. 
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Food Waste Regulation, Three Years OnÕ, Future Food Symposium, Nottingham University Business School, 
University of Nottingham, 20 June 2019. 
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the interests of, or have greater Ômobilising potencyÕ with supermarkets, than those seeking 
more large-scale reimaginations of the food system.169 
Similar criticisms apply to the StrategyÕs pledge to review business implementation 
of guidance on applying the waste hierarchy.  The hierarchy is a legal obligation, originating 
in EU law, which requires those generating waste to take reasonable measures to prioritise 
waste prevention.170  This can be complied with by distributing food surplus for human 
consumption or feeding it to animals, before managing food waste by sending it for AD or 
incineration, or to landfill.  The hierarchyÕs application to food is thus relatively 
straightforward, and so the guidance is unsurprisingly somewhat anodyne and prosaic.171  A 
guidance implementation review is thus no substitute for actual enforcement of the 
hierarchy, the lack of which has been noted.172  In fact, continued lack of enforcement would 
represent an ongoing absence of the state.  Furthermore, the so-called Ôconstructive 
ambiguityÕ of the waste hierarchy was documented as key to creating the moral and economic 
imperative underpinning consensus around Ôdistributed responsibilityÕ for food waste.173 
Curiously, the presentation of data underpinning this finding gives no indication that relevant 
actors appreciate how the hierarchy is a legal obligation, not just a non-legal imperative.174 A 
focus on guidance, rather than enforcement, may perpetuate collective ignorance or amnesia 
in some quarters as to the hierarchyÕs legal status.  
Of course, supporting compliance is an established strategy before escalating 
enforcement.175 To that end, mandatory food waste reporting and prevention targets, on 
which the Strategy also promises to consult, may further support compliance with the waste 
hierarchy.176  In accordance with meta-regulatory approaches, reporting obligations and 
targets can generate information for designing solutions and ÔirritateÕ businesses into 
action,177 and transparency has long been seen as a way to leverage retailersÕ poor 
performance on food waste.178  However, as argued elsewhere, the framing effect of the 
 
169 See eg RP Lee ÔThe Politics of International Agri-Food Policy: Discourses of Trade-Oriented Food 
Security and Food SovereigntyÕ (2013) 22 Environmental Politics 216; O Hospes and A Brons ÔFood System 
Governance: A Systematic Literature ReviewÕ in A Kennedy and J Liljeblad (eds) Food Systems Governance: 
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Guide to Capitalism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2017). 
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18 December 2018) at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/food-and-drink-waste-hierarchy-deal-
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175 See eg I Ayres and J Braithwaite Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1992); N Gunningham and P Grabosky Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).  
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hierarchy can actually divert attention away from overproduction,179 further evidenced by the 
Strategy so explicitly tagging implementation of the hierarchy to redistributing rather than 
reducing surplus: Ôwe expect more surplus food to be redistributed as a resultÕ.180  Enforcing 
the hierarchy is thus no panacea, and may simply legitimate, rather than challenge, the 
overproduction of surplus.  We might thus query to what extent this really represents the 
state Ôstepping back inÕ, highlighting the potential for a mismatch between rhetorical frames 
and meaningful action, while simultaneously pushing the problem of surplus to the 
background.  
 
On-farm food waste and UTP powers in the Agriculture Bill 
Significantly, the Agriculture Bill 2017-19 would provide powers to address UTPs 
which, as the Strategy states, Ôare often the cause of viable produce going to wasteÕ, 
particularly on farms.181  The powers apply to agreements between first purchasers, such as 
processors and distributers, and agricultural producers, usually smaller farmers particularly 
vulnerable to UTPs.182  The Secretary of State would be able to introduce statutory codes of 
conduct, and specify the content of contractual terms often associated with driving 
overproduction and waste. Powers to fund producer groups pursuing joint business models, 
such as short supply chains and alternative markets, would additionally support producers in 
selling surplus elsewhere.183    
These fair dealing powers are sought explicitly to inter alia address the (conservatively 
estimated) 3.6m tonnes of food wasted annually on farms, and the Strategy acknowledges 
the structural power imbalances within which incentives to overproduce are embedded.184  
For example, farmers routinely overproduce as a deliberate strategy to avoid being unable to 
meet orders (or last minute increases), and potential delisting by a purchaser as a result.185  
This overproduction can be wasteful when (contractually permissible) last minute quantity 
reductions or cancellations leave insufficient time for producers to find alternative buyers, 
or if producers are prohibited from selling surplus elsewhere.186  Unfairness can also arise 
when producers are forced to bear the financial costs of this surplus/waste.  Powers to define 
 
179 Framing debates by reference to the waste hierarchy 'masks more fundamental questions as to whether we 
should be producing the quantities of food, in the way and places that we do', Bradshaw, above n 5, p 329. 
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the content of  contacts, which more powerful market actors such as processors, distributors 
and retailers are presently able to impose on smaller suppliers,187 thus have the potential to 
tackle overproduction and waste by minimising the financial and contractual risks of  
underproduction.   
The Strategy is thus less restrictive than the Programme in its diagnostic framing, 
which framed food waste as arising from slightly (rather than fundamentally misaligned) 
incentives, or informational (as opposed to power) asymmetries.  However, the Strategy casts 
these powers as seeking to distribute rather than reduce surplus, by making it easier for 
producers to find alternative outlets for produce, the present difficulties of which mean 
Ôperfectly good food never even reaches the shop shelfÕ.188  If overproduction is in the 
prognostic frame (or the goal of intervention), it is subtle.  While use of these powers may 
thus reduce the financial and contractual risks farmers face by not overproducing, the explicit 
framing of these powers is to make it easier for producers (not retailers) to bear the burden 
of surplus, rather than seeing that level of surplus reduced. 
That being said, these measures are more interventionist than voluntary agreements 
and arguably have the potential to realign power relations.  While contractual regulation 
might not be a substitute for hierarchical manifestations of the state, at least when 
enforcement is through private law,189 the Bill includes powers to establish a public 
enforcement regime, likely administered by the Rural Payments Agency (RPA).190  Specifying 
the terms of contracts, with credible enforcement by a public body, is very much the state 
stepping back in.191  
That the powers are sought within the context of upstream agricultural policy does 
begin to situate food waste within farm-to-fork thinking.192 However, the manner of 
implementation is not the whole-systems approach expected by a fully elaborated resource 
management frame.  The new RPA regime will sit alongside the Code, which protects direct 
suppliers of the UKÕs 10 major supermarkets from UTPs. Farmers tend to be indirect 
suppliers, so that most of them are not covered by the Code.193  The new powers thus create 
a separate regime covering agreements between first purchasers of agricultural products (not 
usually supermarkets) and producers (farmers).194 This fragmented approach was criticised 
by the House of Commons EFRA Committee, who Ôsaw no reasonÕ for Ôtwo separate 
processes and enforcement bodiesÕ.195  
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As a result, those major retailers most heavily implicated in driving overproduction 
escape direct legal responsibility for food wasted on farms and by other indirect suppliers.  
Given the literature is clear that frames are often (as above) about the Ôpolitical strength of 
different groupsÕ, it may thus be no coincidence that some of the most powerful actors are 
largely untouched by legal responsibility for food waste along the supply chain.  Indeed, the 
Strategy actively confirms support for ongoing ÔcollaborativeÕ (voluntary) action to address 
retailer responsibility for food waste under Courtauld 2025.196  Responsibility is thus more 
distributed in the StrategyÕs prognostic frame than the ProgrammeÕs, with new obligations 
on first purchasers.  But responsibility for retailers remains limited, raising questions as to 
whether an Ôextended producer responsibilityÕ regime for food waste is warranted.197  At the 
same time, the StrategyÕs otherwise more interventionist frame works mostly within the 
status quo: supermarket dominance is relatively unchallenged, in turn pushing into the 
background alternative visions of the food system, such as locally based food economies and 
shorter supply chains.198 
Interestingly, the Agriculture Bill extends the geographical reach of these obligations 
in ways which are consistent with an elaborated resource management approach.  Powers to 
regulate contract terms extend to agreements between producers outside of the UK and UK-
based first purchasers.199  It is curious that this garners no attention in the Strategy, 
particularly given the entire chapter on international leadership.200  However, extending the 
geographical remit of regulation may just add to the challenges of fragmentation.  Multiple 
interventions (the ongoing presence of waste law, especially the waste hierarchy, new powers 
under the Agriculture Bill, voluntary agreements, and the Code) come with a variety of 
respective regulators (the Environment Agency, the RPA, WRAP and the GCA), with 
different responsible government departments and sub-teams (waste and agriculture teams 
within Defra, and the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy).  With this 
comes a proliferation of frames across departments, policy domains, regulators, and time, 
which may not cohere into a coherent narrative.  Indeed, the challenge of a more elaborate 
frame is the management of an ever-changing and unwieldy beast.201  Furthermore, a 
fragmented landscape, as Parker and Johnson note, creates opportunities for law and 
regulation Ôto be shaped by short-term political interests and not by social and ecological 
realitiesÕ.202  How these regimes are to coexist in an increasingly crowded and fragmented 
regulatory space is unclear,203 and they may be vulnerable to interests, such as those of 
retailers, preferring more restricted food waste frames. These tasks seem beyond what is 
 
196 HM Government The Strategy, above n 6, p 104. 
197 Extended producer responsibility is a regulatory technique which imposes costs on producers (broadly 
defined to include retailers) for the post-consumption costs of products; see further Fisher, Lange and 
Scotford, above n 113, pp 550Ð551; Bradshaw, above n 5. 
198 See eg Holt-Gimnez and others, above n 78; Parker and Johnson, above n 76; Mourad, above n 70.  
199 Agriculture Bill 2017-19, clause 27(10). 
200 HM Government The Strategy, above n 6, p 99 and Ch 6 on ÔGlobal Britain: International LeadershipÕ. 
201 See eg Scotford and Robinson, above n 61, on the Ôunwieldy legal beastÕ that is environmental law. 
202 Parker and Johnson, above n 76, p 11.7 (citing Review in Advance version, 10 June 2019). 
203 See eg the need to stich different instruments together within regimes typified by ÔpatchworkÕ forms of 
governance, explored by C Holley and A Kennedy ÔGoverning the Energy-Water-Food Nexus: Regulating 
Unconventional Gas Development in Queensland, AustraliaÕ (2019) 59 Jurimetrics (forthcoming). 
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achievable by the StrategyÕs Food Surplus and Waste Champion, whose remit (on paper) is 
limited to awareness-raising.204 
 
Downstream food waste 
The StrategyÕs approach to downstream food waste, concerning consumers and 
households, though relatively brief, raises similar issues as to the relationship between the 
causes of the problem (diagnostic framing) and the scope of interventions (prognostic 
framing).  Measures outlined which seek to make it Ôeasier for people to waste less foodÕ 
include working with industry on labelling and packaging; monitoring implementation of 
best practice by retailers and brands; and supporting work to prevent citizen food waste.205  
Actions on household food waste by businesses are coordinated primarily by WRAP.  WRAP 
has significant and valuable expertise, but it does not have the hierarchical or cross-policy 
clout which may be necessary to tackle retailer incentives to drive overconsumption and 
address downstream food waste.  WRAPÕs best practice guidance on when to use best before 
dates,206 for example, is incapable of addressing the very distribution of power within the 
legal frameworks on food labelling.207  Yet the allocation of responsibilities within that regime 
allows food businesses considerable scope in addressing the tensions between profit, safety 
and waste, in ways which benefit them reputationally and financially but to the detriment of 
food waste imperatives.208  Labelling guidance is therefore no panacea, and the preference 
for outsourcing from government may restrict the systematic consideration of alternative 
(potentially legislative) approaches.209  Meanwhile, the focus on labelling may actively shift 
the burden of food waste away from retailers and back on to the consumer,210 in ways which 
are not in keeping with a meaningful distribution of responsibility.  Again, the broader 
diagnostic attribution provided by the Strategy, which admits the role of structures in 
consumer food waste, is (mis)matched with a narrower prognostic frame which is hollowed 
out, and shifts burdens to consumers.   
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Frame critical analysis of the Strategy reveals a significant shift in EnglandÕs approach to food 
waste.  Special treatment is a noteworthy departure from restrictively framing food waste as 
a generic waste problem, although the importance of some interventions, such as impact-
 
204 HM Government The Strategy, above n 6, p 103. 
205 Ibid, pp 107Ð109. 
206 WRAP, ÔFood Date Labelling and Storage AdviceÕ (WRAP, 2017). 
207 Bradshaw, above n 5. 
208 Stuart, above n 75; Bradshaw, above n 5. See also Feedback ÔNo Use Crying over Spilled Milk? How 
Wrong Date Labels Are Driving Milk Waste and Harming the EnvironmentÕ (London: Feedback, 2019).  
Milk is also good example of the nexus between waste, supermarket power and UTPs. See eg MN Cardwell 
ÔFarmers, Milk Prices and Rural IndignationÕ (2015) 5 Oati Socio-Legal Series 51; Beaton-Wells and Paul-
Taylor, above n 77, p 43. 
209 Which for the UK, at present, lies at the EU Level, so for now beyond the UKÕs full control, see further 
Bradshaw, above n 5. 
210 I am grateful to Christine Parker for this point. 
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based reporting and the global reach of UTP powers, have been downplayed.  Moving away 
from framing growth as the goal, to framing growth as part of the problem, has also opened 
up space for contemplating governmental intervention.   
However, the StrategyÕs focus on farmers and charities redistributing (rather than 
reducing) surplus fails to respond to its own elaborated account of the causes of food waste, 
which acknowledges structural overproduction and overconsumption.  Shifting 
responsibility away from retailers and the state echoes how frames can reflect the outcome 
of power dynamics and reinforce a systemÕs status quo.  Furthermore, the potential 
disconnect between rhetorical framing and practical action is almost obscured by the 
StrategyÕs more inclusive language, its acknowledgement of surplus as problematic, and its 
promised sense of intervention.  Promises to consult on food waste legislation are not 
promises to legislate.  The continued reliance on guidance, collaborative/voluntary strategies 
and WRAP, together with the fragmented approach to UTPs, indicate a reluctance to step in 
where it may be needed most: against the interests of major retailers through direct legal 
responsibility for food waste.   
In addition, if powers under the Agriculture Bill are used, and legislation on targets, 
reporting and mandatory donation come to fruition, the previously hollowed out governance 
of food waste will be populated by increasing levels and layers of legal and regulatory 
complexity, all informed by different frames from different political eras.  This is typical of 
environmental law, but it raises familiar challenges which require not only government 
oversight and coordination, but a scholarly reengagement with waste.  Otherwise, the fresh 
impetus to address food waste as more than a generic waste problem could result in 
fragmented rather than distributed forms of responsibility for managing a particularly 
precious resource. 
 
 
